I am bemused, astonished and dismayed by the sheer volume of words squandered over the past century on explicating the supposed complexities of the causes of the first World War. I grieve for the hectares of trees whose wood might otherwise have gone to the construction of bridges and homes, instead reduced to the millions of pages making up academic journals and texts addressing this issue, to be read almost exclusively by other academicians who, like the authors, apparently have nothing better to do with their time.
In point of fact, the cause(s) of World War I is simple, straightforward and self-evident: when a large group of men in uniform carrying loaded rifles instead of passports roll their cannon across the border of a neutral nation it is they who started the war – they are the aggressors. That’s it, plain and simple.
In 1914 this was the scenario authorized, plotted and executed by the German High Command which had persuaded itself – better now than later. All other notables (save one) who were purportedly instrumental in setting in motion the 20th Century’s first, and arguably most gratuitous tragedy were nothing but bit players, swept along by forces beyond their control and of which they had at best incomplete and largely retrospective knowledge.
Kaiser Wilhelm’s intemperance and a seeming neurogenic inability to control his mouth have earned him a largely undeserved reputation as villain-in-chief whereas in fact, in the last days of peace, Willy made a good faith effort, indeed frantic attempts – to roll back the clock.
No, it wasn’t the Kaiser, however apt a figure for media caricature he may have been. Rather, the evidence is compelling in their indicting another truly malevolent historical figure without whose Machiavellian exertions there would have been no war. Conrad, the Hapsburg’s Minister of Defense (and late, unlamented racist peacenik Ferdinand’s antithesis and nemesis) lobbied the old emperor indefatigably to declare war on Serbia while simultaneously harassing Hungary’s prudent prime minister to go along until both leaders finally gave in. It was Conrad’s spirit if not actual words that informed the draconian ultimatum to Serbia, expressly tossed through a window for response so small as to allow no time for diplomats to intervene; and it was Conrad who was the first commander to mobilize, even after historically feisty Serbia astonishingly acceded to virtually all of Austria’s demands.
For their part, the Germans had no interest in yet another Balkan squabble which they saw merely as an opportune rationale, a convenient mechanism to get the trains moving and the bullets flying toward France and Russia. Immediately upon encouraging Conrad to cash the infamous “blank check” uncaging the dogs of war, the Germans harnessed the beasts to their own long considered, pre-Schlieffen and far more expansionist war aims – as the hapless Belgians were merely the first to discover.
So there you have it. No nine hundred page book, no arcane essay in impenetrable prose – just a few short paragraphs.
That I am able to thoroughly cover this topic with such clarity and concision is not because I am a master historian – I’m a simple country doctor, for heaven’s sakes – but because the archives fail utterly to support any other conclusions.